Abstract: Particularism is usually understood as a position in moral philosophy. In fact, it is a view about all reasons, not only moral reasons. Here I show that particularism is a familiar and controversial position in the philosophy of science and mathematics. I then argue for particularism with respect to scientific and mathematical reasoning. This has a bearing on moral particularism, because if particularism about moral reasons is true, then particularism must be true with respect to reasons of any sort, including mathematical and scientific reasons.
3 significance in virtue of their relevance to the question 'would this untruth be a lie?'
The principle ('Lying is wrong') puts the question to the case. 5 The details of the case matter insofar as they bear on the answer to this question.
Particularists deny this. Particularists think that the rightness of a right act or judgment can be understood without reference to any such generalities. The morally significant details of the case owe their moral significance not to some abstract principle, but rather to each other. A morally important detail is morally important in virtue of its relation to the factual complex of which it is a part.
For example, consider the assassination of Julius Caesar. This was an illegal act, but everyone (generalists and particularists alike) recognises that one is sometimes morally obliged to break the law. So was it morally wrong? For a Kantian, the fact that this act was a murder makes it immoral. On this view, Kantian moral theory shows us that murder is wrong, and explains why it is wrong. With this general moral principle available, we know that Caesar's murder was wrong as soon as we know that it was a murder. For the particularist, however, general theories and principles do not decide the matter, because a single act cannot be understood in isolation. To treat a deed in this way is to abstract it from the complex of related events and circumstances that make it what it is, and thus to risk misjudging it. Caesar was murdered, but to judge this deed morally (as opposed to legally) we must know who murdered him, how, when, where and why. That is why particularism is sometimes described as a kind of holism. The moral rightness or wrongness of Caesar's assassination depends on its relations with all sorts of circumstances, in addition to those that identify it as a murder. Merely knowing that this deed was an instance of the general type murder is not, for the particularist, enough.
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To make sense of this, we should think of the act or judgment as a node in a vast and dense network of events and circumstances, none of which can be understood or correctly characterised in isolation. This recalls Butterfield's view that history is "the whole network produced by countless complications perpetually involving each other" (Butterfield 1931, 74-75 Thus, particularism cannot defeat generalism in a single stroke but must instead aim to fell it with a thousand cuts. This could take some time.
Fortunately, this debate has happened before, in the philosophy of scientific methodology. It is to this earlier version that I now turn.
Science
Parallels between normative philosophy of science and ethical theory are not unprecedented. The most famous is probably Kuhn's claim that scientific standards function as values rather than as rules (Kuhn 1970, 184-6) . What he meant is that it is easy to agree a list of desiderata for scientific theories: simplicity, generality, empirical adequacy, mathematical tractability, metaphysical plausibility, and so on. another. This is hardly surprising, as Kuhn had rather more human history to reflect on than did Aristotle, so the problem of rational transition between successive mentalities was more salient to him. These differences mark the limit of this parallel between Aristotle's ethics and Kuhn's philosophy of science, but what matters for the present purpose is their common view that sound judgment cannot be captured in a system of principles. They both insist that judgment depends on educated perception.
They share this view with moral particularism, and some moral particularists cite
Aristotle as a proto-particularist for this reason. 8 10 That is, a normative methodology of science must either become a formal abstraction (with only a tenuous connection to scientific practice), or it must be elaborated so that it gives the right advice on all occasions (but the circumstances of enquiry are inexhaustibly indefinite).
Studies by historians and philosophers less infamous than Feyerabend confirm that scientific reasoning is indeed particularist in structure. 11 As in moral particularism, the chief part of the argument consists in pointing out the multi-valency of reasons.
For example, naïve falsificationism held that if a theory is inconsistent with the results of an experiment, the theory must be abandoned. Man proposes; nature disposes.
When theory and fact clash, surely the theory must give way. However, this view is excessively simple. Sometimes, an experimental or observational fact is a reason to
give up a theory. On other occasions though, the contradiction of theory and fact may be a reason to give up the fact. That is, the apparent empirical fact may be an artefact of the experiment, and there may be good grounds to recognise this. Take the case of cold fusion: the theories that made cold fusion seem unlikely were much better confirmed than the measurements of excess heat that were supposed to show that cold fusion was taking place. Or, a contradiction between a theory and an experiment or for Newtonian physics). Or scientists might decide to restructure the domain so that the awkward fact no longer falls within the scope of the theory (something like this happened in early modern studies of heat, which contracted to consider only combustion, leaving the heat generated by animals' bodies aside). Or it may be possible to redescribe the data in a way that resolves the contradiction. And so on.
There is no general recipe to tell a scientist what to do when faced with a contradiction between theory and data. Nor is there any hope of specifying in advance a finite list of possible options. 12 None of this entails that scientific practice is dangerously irrational or unreliably subjective. It merely shows that empirical scientific reasoning is particularist in structure.
In the next section, I wish to carry this argument into mathematical practice. First, however, I wish to set aside a possible confusion. One might think that the highly general scope of physical laws entails that they must be arrived at by generalist means. This does not follow. Truths in fundamental physics are true at all times and places, but they are arrived at and justified by context-specific arguments with a particularist structure. A result is established, or doubted, or refuted, or set aside as an open problem for reasons that depend on what else the scientists believe at the time about the structure of the universe and also about the reliability of specific 11 experiments (to mention just one of the many circumstances that might bear on such judgments). The highly general scope of fundamental physics in no way requires that reasoning about fundamental physics should be generalist. To see this, consider time.
Scientific reasoning is temporal in the sense that it depends on its own history. We hold the scientific theories that we do in part because they superseded our previous theories; they are our least lousy theories so far. 13 On the other hand, the results of fundamental physical science are tenseless. Whenever the conditions of the theory hold, the laws hold. As with time so with space; the reasoning is local even though the resulting laws hold everywhere in the universe.
The point is that particularism is a view about reasons; it is not about causes. Nature, as described by the natural sciences, does conform to general laws, while human reasoning and reasoned action do not, except for laws of logic so abstract that they leave almost all the work of judgment undone. Natural events may be understood in isolation without fear of distortion. For example, we can understand the physics of a collision between two objects if we know what they are composed of, how fast they are travelling, and in what directions. We do not need to know how the objects came to be on those trajectories, or whether this was the first collision between them. In contrast, suppose two people meet. It may make a difference to the significance of the meeting if they were looking out for each other, or if they met regularly, or just happened to bump into each other. Without knowing this, we do not know what sort of event it is: a fortuitous encounter or a rendezvous. This may make all the difference in, for example, divorce proceedings. 14 Without setting the encounter in context, we cannot describe it, let alone explain how it turned out. We can understand physical collisions by citing laws, precisely because physical collisions do not depend essentially on their contexts. 15 Truths in pure mathematics are yet more general than those in fundamental physics, but reasoning about them is nevertheless particularist in structure. In the next section, I suggest that mathematical reasoning has the multi-valent structure identified by Dancy: that the same feature can be a reason for different beliefs and actions on different occasions.
Mathematics
One might suppose that the rationality that guides and secures mathematical progress Ideally, one would illustrate this argument with the latest and best mathematics.
There are philosophical studies of contemporary advanced mathematics that one might turn to that end, just as there are for empirical science. 17 However, the point of this paper is to connect hitherto isolated philosophical discussions. I would not serve this purpose by presenting ethicists with examples drawn from the frontiers of 13 contemporary mathematics. Instead, I shall appeal to one of the founding texts in this sort of approach to mathematics: Lakatos' Proofs and Refutations.
Proofs and Refutations tells the story of a mathematical conjecture, from its origin as a geometrical hypothesis to the point at which it ceases to depend on our spatial intuitions and becomes a piece of abstract mathematics. This story is the vehicle for a discussion of mathematical practice and the philosophy of mathematical research. It takes place in a fictional classroom dialogue while Lakatos discusses the real history in his footnotes. From these footnotes, we learn that the various methodological moves made and philosophical stances taken by the characters in the dialogue were borrowed from real historical mathematicians. Lakatos was not making it up.
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The conjecture is in solid geometry. It is that for any polyhedron, the number of faces minus the number of edges plus the number of vertices equals two. For example, a cube has six faces, twelve edges and eight vertices. So in this case, the sum is 2 8 12 -6 = +
. A tetrahedron has four faces, six edges and four vertices: 2 4 6 -4 = + .
This formula holds for all the familiar regular polyhedra (exercise: check the remaining three platonic solids). But does it hold generally? The short answer is 'no'. There are solids for which the formula does not hold, such as some solids with tunnels through them, or step-pyramids. Consider the solid cube with a cubic space in the middle (illustrated). For this object, the alternating sum of faces, edges and vertices comes to four. We now have at least four options: we could abandon the conjecture because it has a counterexample; we could refuse to accept the hollow cube as a counterexample because it is not a 'proper' polyhedron; we could redescribe 14 it so that the contradiction dissolves; or we could keep both the conjecture and the counterexample while we try to advance the field as a whole to the point where we could make a satisfactory judgment. If we have an attempted proof of the conjecture, we can engage in proof-analysis with the hollow cube in mind. Lakatos' dialogue explores all of these options. It turns out that, as in empirical science, each of these reactions to a counterexample is appropriate on some occasions. What we ought not to do is react in the same way every time. Sometimes, a deep idea finds expression in a neat theorem. If we reject every conjecture that suffers a counterexample, we may lose such theorems, and gain little in return. Instead, we have the option of adjusting definitions so that the 'counterexamples' cease to threaten the theorem (in this case, we might decide that 'proper' polyhedral solids do not have cavities). On the other hand, if we always defend conjectures against counterexamples by insisting that the apparent counterexample does not really fall under the conjecture (as we might insist that a step-pyramid is not really a polyhedron) our conceptual innovations will always be conservative and often ad hoc. Sometimes the presentation of a weird object (such as, say, a space-filling curve, or a function that is everywhere continuous but nowhere differentiable) will force mathematicians to rethink more profoundly a body of knowledge that had seemed familiar and settled (and there is no finite list of procedures that add up to 'rethinking more profoundly'). Finally, we cannot always defer judgment, or there would be nothing but open problems. Here, in mathematics,
we have the holism of reasons. The same reason (the presence of a counterexample to an accepted conjecture) can point in opposing directions or in none, depending on the details of the situation. There is no rulebook or set of methodological principles for deciding how to respond in any given case. Mathematicians want theorems and proofs that are deep, fruitful and elegant, and there is no recipe for these. 15 Lakatos' discussion immediately introduces an attempt to prove the conjecture, and this allows him to explore the justificatory practices of pure mathematics. Proofs are not merely means for recognising truths. On the contrary, proof-ideas can be some of the deepest and most interesting ideas in mathematics. The mathematician Yehuda
Rav claims that "Theorems are only the headlines; proofs are the real story" (Rav 1999, 22) . The important point here is that the justification of a theorem requires more than a valid proof. We need to show that the concepts and definitions employed in the theorem are well-chosen and that the original question is worth pursing. In this sense, a proof that a chess-problem has a solution in a given number of moves may be valid, but the whole enterprise may be unjustified because there is no mathematical In the case at hand, the first proof that Lakatos considers suggests criteria for identifying 'real' polyhedra (it is a sort of topological thought-experiment that cannot be performed on objects with cavities, so if we adopt this proof then we have to refuse these objects the status of polyhedron and consequently they are no longer counterexamples to the theorem). In the end, in this case, the preferred option is to keep both the counterexample and the conjecture in mind while the discussion goes in search of a deeper understanding of polyhedral surfaces. At this point, the question is passing from geometry to topology. To see this, consider that you could make the surface out of different coloured canvas panels and it would not matter whether it were stretched taut or not, so long as we could identify faces, edges and vertices. For example, the conjecture may be true of a tent with a sewn-in groundsheet (depending on the design). It does not matter whether the tent is erected or not. (Exercise: is the Euler conjecture true of a duvet-cover?) 20 In fact, we can push a bit further. Does the conjecture hold for a surface whose panels pass through each other? This is rather hard to imagine so long as we think of the faces as made of some material like canvas. But go back to the cube with a cubic space inside. Think of the two cube-shaped surfaces not as two surfaces but as two wire frames. Or to return to tents: we can see whether the conjecture holds of a given tent just by looking at the frame, provided the seams of the canvas correspond to the poles of the tent. 21 When we think of the hollow cube as a pair of cube-shaped frames, we can see that their spatial relationship does not matter. The conjecture is true of each of them separately, and would remain so even if they were tangled together rather than neatly nested. So now the question is: of which wire frames is the conjecture true? This question takes the problem into algebraic topology, where we shall not follow it. It is enough to see that this question-about wire frames-allows us to answer questions about polyhedral surfaces and solids that we could not answer so long as we were 17 thinking directly about surfaces and solids. The point is that following a general methodological principle-any general methodological principle, or even a finite set of conjoined general methodological principles-in the face of a range of counterexamples would not have brought us to this deeper understanding of the phenomenon.
Conclusion
If particularism is true, then holism about reasons must be true, not only in the case of moral reasoning but of every sort of reason. In that case, holism about reasons must be true of scientific and mathematical reasoning. This leads to a familiar debate about the extent to which sound scientific practice can be captured in a system of general principles. The heroic phase of this debate (Popper-Kuhn-Lakatos-Feyerabend) is now a standard part of the undergraduate curriculum. Since then, philosophers of science have either abandoned the notion of a universal scientific method, replaced it with something much looser (like Kuhn's list of desiderata), 22 or retreated to the safety of abstract logical theory. 23 In the case of mathematics, the corresponding debate is rather less well developed, though the materials for it are increasingly available. 24 As with empirical science, attention to practice encourages the claim that a reason (in this case the combination of conjecture and counterexample) might point in any one of three ways depending on the overall state of the argument at the time.
Holism is not, as Dancy supposes, uncontroversially true of theoretical reasons. But if the argument presented here is sound then it is true, even in those theoretical domains that seem, at first glance, least hospitable to it. At the very least, I have shown that particularism stands or falls on the same ground in the ethical, scientific and mathematical cases. This is what one would expect, given that it is a view about
